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This article reviews some of the important developments in
the area of domestic relations law between May 1995 and July
1996. Of particular significance were opinions by the Court of
Appeals of Virginia regarding issues of imputed income, the
definition of a "day" for shared custody purposes, and the role
of marital fault in equitable distribution determinations. The
majority of bills passed in the 1996 Session of the General
Assembly simply fine-tuned existing law. However, notable
statutory revisions were made in the areas of child support and
domestic violence. Although the legislature replaced the term




If your client wishes to establish a common-law marriage in
Virginia, Kelderhaus v. Kelderhaus' provides some ground
rules. In Kelderhaus, a couple married in California, despite the
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fact that the husband's divorce from his first wife was not fi-
nal.3 Shortly thereafter, the couple relocated to Virginia, travel-
ing through Texas and Oklahoma, states that recognize com-
mon-law marriages.4 When the putative wife filed for divorce,
the trial court declined to recognize the common-law marriage
and dismissed the action.5 The court of appeals affirmed based
on the fact that Texas and Oklahoma both require that, in
order for a common-law marriage to be recognized in their
state, the parties must mutually represent to others while in
that state that they are husband and wife.6 Simply migrating
through these states will not suffice.7
B. Paternity
The issue presented in Department of Social Services ex rel.
Comptroller of Virginia v. Flaneary8 was whether, in a contest-
ed paternity proceeding, Virginia Code section 20-49.1(B) re-
quired the trial court to give genetic test results affirming at
least a ninety-eight percent probability of paternity the same
legal effect as a judgment finding paternity.' The court of ap-
peals found this code section inapplicable to contested paternity
disputes, noting that section 20-49.1(B) "applies only when the
parties have signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity
under oath, or after having signed such an acknowledgment
have obtained a 'subsequent' genetic test that aTffims at least a
[ninety-eight percent] probability of paternity."" Since the par-
ties in this case had not signed a paternity acknowledgment,"
and paternity was contested, the court of appeals held that the
applicable statute was Code section 20-49.4 under which all rel-
evant evidence of paternity is admissible.' Thus, DNA test
results showing a 99.92% probability of paternity, in conjunc-
3. Id. at 724, 467 S.E.2d at 304.
4. Id. at 724-25, 467 S.E.2d at 304.
5. Id. at 723-24, 467 S.E.2d at 304.
6. Id. at 726-27, 467 S.E.2d at 305.
7. Id.
8. 22 Va. App. 293, 469 S.E.2d 79 (1996).
9. Id. at 296, 469 S.E.2d at 80.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 304, 469 S.E.2d at 84.
12. Id. at 302, 469 S.E.2d at 83.
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tion with uncontroverted evidence that the parties had inter-
course during the period of conception, constituted clear and
convincing evidence of paternity under section 20-49.4."3
C. Property Settlement Agreements
Spagnolo v. Spagnolo'4 dealt with a property settlement
agreement in which the parties agreed that, because the hus-
band assumed full responsibility for the child's college education
and agreed to pay the child's health insurance until he graduat-
ed from college, the husband would pay $200 per month in
child support rather than the amount specified by statutory
guidelines.' The husband appealed after the trial judge af-
firmed, ratified, and incorporated by reference the entire prop-
erty settlement agreement into the final divorce decree, and
then ordered the husband to pay, contrary to the property set-
tlement agreement, a significantly higher amount of child sup-
port pursuant to the guidelines.' 6
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for reconsidera-
tion,' pointing out that a trial judge is not obligated to accept
or adopt the parents' child support agreement if the amount of
child support is contested." The court of appeals noted that
the trial judge's alternative to adopting the child support agree-
ment was to affirm, ratify, and incorporate the property settle-
ment agreement except for the child support provisions "if that
result is consistent with the terms of the agreement."' This
would enable the husband to assert defenses to his obligations
under the property settlement agreement to pay the child's
post-majority expenses. 0 The trial court must first determine
child support in accordance with the guidelines,2' but may de-
viate from the presumptive amount of support if the statutory
factors make such a deviation justifiable.' The trial court
13. Id. at 306, 469 S.E.2d at 85.
14. 20 Va. App. 736, 460 S.E.2d 616 (1995).
15. Id. at 739-40, 460 S.E.2d at 617-18.
16. Id. at 741, 460 S.E.2d at 618.
17. Id. at 747, 460 S.E.2d at 621.
18. Id. at 743, 460 S.E.2d at 619.
19. Id. at 744, 460 S.E.2d at 620.
20. Id. at 744-45, 460 S.E.2d at 620.
21. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, -108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
22. Spagnolo, 20 Va. App. at 744, 460 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Alexander v. Alex-
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should next consider whether the property settlement
agreement reflects statutory factors which provide a basis for
deviating from the child support guidelines.2' Thus, the trial
judge must follow either the property settlement agreement or
the statutes, but not both.'
Jones v. Harrison25 addressed the issue of whether the pro-
visions of a support agreement and property settlement entitled
a decedent's children from a previous marriage to impose a con-
structive trust upon life insurance proceeds." The deceased
husband and his first wife had a property settlement agreement
providing that the husband would, at his election, either contin-
ue a life insurance trust agreement for the benefit of the
parties' children, or simply make the children beneficiaries of
the insurance policies.27 However, less than one year after
their divorce, the husband modified his life insurance trust and
policies such that, upon his death thirty years later, all of his
insurance proceeds were paid to his second wife.28  The
decedent's children, claiming that their father breached the
property settlement agreement, sued the second wife in her
individual capacity and as executrix of the decedent's estate,
seeking to impose a constructive trust upon the life insurance
proceeds.29
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the second wife's
argument that the father had only agreed to provide insurance
coverage to his children for a limited time, and declined to
construe contracts without termination dates to imply a reason-
able time for performance. 30 Despite the second wife's lack of
participation in, or knowledge of the contractual breach, the
supreme court held that the father had breached the contract
by canceling the children's coverage, and imposed a constructive
trust upon $70,000 of the life insurance proceeds."
ander, 12 Va. App. 691, 695-96, 406 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1991)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 746, 460 S.E.2d at 620-21.
25. 250 Va. 64, 458 S.E.2d 766 (1995).
26. Id. at 65-66, 458 S.E.2d at 767.
27. Id. at 66, 458 S.E.2d at 767-68.
28. Id. at 66-67, 458 S.E.2d at 768.
29. Id. at 67, 458 S.E.2d at 768.
30. Id. at 68-69, 458 S.E.2d at 768-69.
31. Id. at 70, 458 S.E.2d at 770.
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In 1981, Congress enacted the Foreign Service Act of 1980,32
entitling former spouses of foreign service employees to a retire-
ment annuity of up to fifty percent of the employee's annuity
depending on the length of the employee's service and marriage
"[u]nless otherwise expressly provided by [a] spousal agreement
or court order."3 In Nicholson v. Nicholson,' the husband,
who was employed by the United States Foreign Service
throughout the parties' marriage,35 argued unsuccessfully that
his wife had waived, in their property settlement agreement,
her statutory right to a share of his retirement annuity. 6
The general purpose of the Nicholson's property settlement
agreement, as stated in its preamble, was "to effect a full and
complete settlement of [the parties'] respective property
rights."37 According to the court of appeals, the sole consider-
ation was whether the property settlement agreement's terms,
when considered together with the preamble's general state-
ment of purpose, satisfied the requirements of the federal stat-
utes38 that the spousal agreement must "expressly" provide for
a waiver or relinquishment of the entitlement to a share of the
member's retirement annuity." The court of appeals acknowl-
edged that a general waiver may be sufficient if the parties'
intent to include pension or retirement benefits is clearly stated
in the spousal agreement,' but noted that the Nicholson's
property settlement agreement mentioned neither pension nor
32. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4226 (1980).
33. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 21 Va. App. 231, 235, 463 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1995)
(alteration in original) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 4054(a)(1) (1980)).
34. 21 Va. App. 231, 463 S.E.2d 334 (1995).
35. Id. at 235, 463 S.E.2d at 336.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 236, 463 S.E.2d at 337. The agreement also contained the following
language:
5. It is further understood and agreed that both parties shall have the
right to sell or otherwise dispose of any and all property, which he or
she may now or in the future own personally (and not listed herein)
without demand being made upon either of them. ...
6. Each of the parties does hereby relinquish and release to the other all
rights and curtesy or dower that he or she may have in the property
hereinafter acquired by either of them ....
Id.
38. 22 U.S.C. §§ 4054(a)(1), 4060(bXl)(A) (1994).
39. Nicholson, 21 Va. App at 239, 463 S.E.2d at 338-39.
40. Id. at 240, 463 S.E.2d at 339.
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retirement benefits, nor the husband's entitlement under the
Foreign Services Act.4 The court of appeals therefore reversed
the trial court and held that the wife had not waived any prop-
erty rights or entitlements she may have had to any portion of
her former spouse's pension or any other retirement benefits."
D. Support
1. Spousal Support
a. Pendente Lite Support
In Sargent v. Sargent,' the husband argued that spousal
support paid to his wife pursuant to a pendente lite order was
"spousal support paid pursuant to a pre-existing order" and
must be included when calculating the wife's income for perma-
nent support purposes." The court of appeals disagreed, rea-
soning that the plain meaning of "pre-existing order" in Virgin-
ia Code section 20-108.2(C) is an order that has continuing
effect and provides a spouse with an income source.' Includ-
ing the pendente lite support amount in the wife's income when
calculating the permanent support would effectively charge the
wife with income she no longer receives, since a pendente lite
support award ends when a permanent support order is en-
tered.'
b. Lightburn v. Lightburn47
Lightburn gave the court of appeals the opportunity to re-
mind practitioners that certain circumstances involved in the
breakup of a marriage "are appropriate considerations for
41. Id. at 241, 463 S.E.2d at 339.
42. Id. at 235, 463 S.E.2d at 336.
43. 20 Va. App. 694, 460 S.E.2d 596 (1995).
44. Id. at 706, 460 S.E.2d at 601 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C) (Repl.
Vol. 1995)).
45. Id.
46. Id., 460 S.E.2d at 601-02 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.1, -108.2 (Repl. Vol.
1995)).
47. 22 Va. App. 612, 472 S.E.2d 281 (1996).
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spousal support, not equitable distribution."' In Lightburn,
the parties separated after just one year of marriage. Eight
months into the marriage, the wife, who had a private counsel-
ing practice in Blacksburg prior to the marriage, moved to
Madison County, to live with her husband.49 The husband then
conveyed a large parcel of land by deed of gift to himself and
his wife as tenants by the entirety. The parties lived on this
property for two months prior to their separation.' In deter-
mining the equitable distribution award, the trial judge consid-
ered the brief duration of the marriage to be a significant fac-
tor, since it aggravated the wife's problems regarding her move
from Blacksburg and her subsequent need to return there when
the marriage failed.5' The trial court thus awarded the wife
one-half of the value of the property. 2 No spousal award was
granted at that time because the trial court considered that the
monetary award addressed the wife's travails connected with
her move.53
The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the trial
court had erroneously considered the short duration of the mar-
riage as a factor in the wife's favor for equitable distribution
purposes." The purpose of Virginia Code section 20-107.3 is
"to divide the value of the marital property between spouses
based upon each spouse's contribution to the acquisition, preser-
vation, or improvement of property obtained during the mar-
riage.""5 The wife's hardships stemming from the divorce had
no relation to the acquisition, care, and maintenance of the
property. 6 Because equitable distribution is based on different
considerations than spousal support, a trial court must deter-
mine the distribution of marital property without regard for the
considerations of spousal support and the factors in section 20-
107.1."7 Section 20-107.3 does not provide for consideration of
48. Id. at 620, 472 S.E.2d at 285.
49. Id. at 614-15, 472 S.E.2d at 282.




54. Id. at 618, 472 S.E.2d at 284.
55. Id. at 619, 472 S.E.2d at 284.
56. Id. at 620, 472 S.E.2d at 285.
57. Id. at 619, 472 S.E.2d at 284.
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evidence of economic or emotional difficulties following di-
vorce."8 The court of appeals found that the equitable distribu-
tion order was based upon factors that were "better suited to
the consideration of spousal support" and implied that the
wife's hardships may have made a lump-sum spousal award
appropriate. 9 In sum, a monetary award is "not statutorily de-
signed to address issues properly related to spousal support."60
c. Imputed Income
In one of the year's most controversial cases, the court of
appeals held that income could be imputed to a retiree at his
pre-retirement salary for purposes of determining spousal sup-
port. In Stubblebine v. Stubblebine,6" the husband retired from
a military career in 1984 and took a job with a private compa-
ny, retiring again in 1990.62 The parties separated in 1991 af-
ter thirty-nine years of marriage." The husband undertook
various independent consulting jobs, the last of which paid
$40,000 per year and ended prior to the divorce filing." At the
time of the divorce trial, the husband, though not gainfully
employed, was working up to sixty hours per week without pay
for a private organization investigating psychic phenomena, and
twenty hours per week without pay helping a female friend
organize and manage her psychiatry practice.6"
The parties agreed that the wife, who was in poor health and
unable to work, would receive half of her husband's two pen-
sions, amounting to a monthly income of $3,058.66 In addition,
the trial court imputed to the husband a salary of $40,000 and
therefore granted the wife's request for spousal support of
$1,000 per month on the ground that the husband, "contrary to
58. Id. at 620, 472 S.E.2d at 285.
59. Id. (citing Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App 1, 389 S.E.2d 723 (1990)).
60. Id. at 621, 472 S.E.2d at 285.
61. 21 Va. App. 635, 466 S.E.2d 764 (1996). See Ryan v. Kramer, 21 Va. App.
212, 463 S.E.2d 328 (1995), infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text, for another case
involving retirement and imputed income.
62. Stubblebine, 21 Va. App. at 638, 466 S.E.2d at 765.
63. Id. at 637, 466 S.E.2d at 765.
64. Id. at 638, 466 S.E.2d at 765.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 638-39, 466 S.E.2d at 765.
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his assertion, is not retired.... Clearly, husband chooses to
work but not earn income which could help support his
wife.... 67
The court of appeals affirmed the spousal support award
despite the husband's argument that such an award would force
persons who have reached usual retirement age to continue
working." While declining to establish a bright-line rule, the
court of appeals stated that "[e]ven at the age of 65 or later, a
payor spouse should not be permitted to unilaterally choose
voluntary retirement if this choice places the receiving spouse
in peril of poverty."69 While acknowledging that courts must
consider the expectations associated with retirement, the court
of appeals held that Virginia Code section 20-107.1 directed it
also to consider that the husband's post-retirement activities
demonstrated his ability to be gainfily employed. 0
In Reece v. Reece, 1 the court of appeals was faced with de-
67. Id. at 639, 466 S.E.2d at 766.
68. Id. at 637, 641, 466 S.E.2d at 765, 767.
69. Id. at 641, 466 S.E.2d at 767 (citing Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So.2d 534, 537 (Fla.
1992)).
70. Id. at 639, 466 S.E.2d at 766. In a blistering dissent, Judge Benton noted
that no evidence supported the trial judge's assumption that the husband could find
gainful employment. Id. at 647-48, 466 S.E.2d at 770 (Benton, J., dissenting).
No evidence proved that any income-producing employment was available
for the husband or that other consulting opportunities were available.
The record contains unrefuted evidence that the husband's last two con-
sulting contracts were involuntarily terminated.... [No evidence proved
that husband could have obtained employment based on his studies of
psychic phenomena.... Where, as in this case, the working spouse has
retired prior to separation and dissolution of the marriage, the decision
to impute income to the working spouse is plainly wrong, absent some
proof of bad faith. Moreover, evidence that the retired spouse remains
active in the pursuit of hobbies and intellectual interests provides no
basis to conclude that the spouse is "working." A spouse should not be
penalized for pursuing his interests if they do not produce any income,
cannot produce income, are unorthodox, or are even unpopular to others.
By imputing a speculative amount of income, the decision penalizes life-
style, where it is clear no such imputation would have been made had
the retired spouse sat around, done nothing, and degenerated .... Ab-
sent evidence of bad faith, nothing in Code Section 20-107.1 authorizes
judges to interfere with decisions made by spouses in a marriage to re-
tire at some point in their lives, to participate in interests special to
them, and enjoy benefits for which they have worked their entire lives.
Id. at 647-51, 466 S.E.2d at 770-72 (Benton, J., dissenting).
71. 22 Va. App. 368, 470 S.E.2d 148 (1996).
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ciding whether failure to relocate constitutes voluntary unem-
ployment or underemployment for purposes of justifying impu-
tation of income.72 Shortly after the parties' separation, the
husband was ordered to pay pendente lite spousal support to
the wife in the amount of $1000 per month.7 3 Several months
later, the husband's employer eliminated his position but
offered him another position at the same salary in Tampa, Flor-
ida, which the husband declined.74 The trial court granted the
husband's motion to decrease his spousal support payments
based on a material change in circumstances,75 and the wife
appealed.76
The court of appeals expressly declined to establish a per se
rule that a supporting spouse always becomes voluntarily un-
employed or underemployed when he refuses to accept an offer
of comparable employment in another geographic location.77
Instead, the court of appeals established a non-exclusive set of
factors to be considered in determining whether a refusal to
relocate constitutes voluntary unemployment or underemploy-
ment:
(1) [T~he supporting spouse's business ties to the communi-
ty; (2) the supporting spouse's familial ties to the commu-
nity; (3) whether the supporting spouse's relocation would
have an undue deleterious effect upon his or her relation-
ship with his or her children or other family members; (4)
the length of time in which the supporting spouse has re-
sided in the community; (5) monetary considerations which
would impose an undue hardship upon the supporting
spouse if he or she were forced to relocate; (6) the 'quality
of life' in the respective communities; (7) the geographic
distance between the respective communities; and (8) the
severity of the burden which a failure to relocate would
have on the obligee spouse.78
72. Id. at 376, 470 S.E.2d at 152.
73. Id. at 371, 470 S.E.2d at 150.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 372, 470 S.E.2d at 150.
76. Id. Although the parties agreed that the husband did not voluntarily choose
to leave his job, and that his job was not eliminated due to any fault on his part,
the wife argued that income should be imputed to the husband based on his failure
to relocate. Id. at 374, 470 S.E.2d at 151.
77. Id. at 375, 470 S.E.2d at 152.
78. Id. at 376, 470 S.E.2d at 152-53.
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Applying these factors to the case, the court of appeals found
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not imputing
income to the husband.7 9
2. Child Support
Auman v. Auman ° presents practitioners with a cautionary
tale for clients inclined to voluntarily offer more child support
than the guidelines would prescribe, since Mr. Auman's volun-
tary post-separation support payments were used to determine
the standard of living to which the child was entitled.8' The
trial judge held that, because the father had voluntarily left a
salaried position for a lower paying job, he was underem-
ployed.82 In determining the father's child support obligation,
the trial court took his post-separation voluntary support pay-
ments into consideration," and held that he must maintain for
the child the lifestyle that his former income supported.'
The court of appeals similarly concluded that a father who
switched to a lower-paying job can have income imputed to him
even though, when he changed jobs, no court-ordered support
obligation existed.' The court of appeals thus broadened the
79. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 153. The husband had strong familial and business ties to
Richmond. Moreover, because the wife was neither destitute nor in poor health, a
greater amount of financial support was not necessary. The distance between Rich-
mond and Tampa also played a relevant role in the court's consideration. Id. at 376-
77, 470 S.E.2d at 153. Moreover, the wife failed to show that other comparable jobs
were available to the husband, nor did she show that he deliberately minimized his
income in order to reduce his support obligation to her. Id. at 374-75, 470 S.E.2d at
151-52.
80. 21 Va. App. 275, 464 S.E.2d 154 (1995).
81. Id. at 278, 464 S.E.2d at 156.
82. Id. Prior to the Auman's separation, the father was laid off. Upon separation,
however, the father voluntarily began paying $100 per child per week in child sup-
port. Id. at 276, 464 S.E.2d at 155. The father took a job paying $13.50 per hour,
and 9 months later voluntarily switched to a job paying $9.50 per hour. Id. at 277,
464 S.E.2d at 156. The following year, he left this position to become a commissioned
salesman. Id. The trial court found that the father's income had decreased almost
$3500 in the first year of separation, and that he projected that his income would
decrease by approximately another $8000 the next year. Id.
83. Id. at 278, 464 S.E.2d at 156.
84. Id. at 279, 464 S.E.2d at 156-57.
85. Id.
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reach of Antonelli v. Antonelli,86 which addressed the imputa-
tion of income after a parent with an existing support order
changes jobs."
In Ryan v. Kramer,88 the court of appeals again relied on
Antonelli 9 in deciding that the trial court had properly imput-
ed income to a parent who, at age 51, voluntarily accepted
early retirement from his job as an airline pilot.9" Since his
retirement, the husband's income dropped from over $12,000
per month to zero as a real estate agent.91 The court of ap-
peals cited Antonelli's warning that, while a parent is not pro-
hibited from voluntarily changing jobs, "the risk of his success
at his new job [is] upon the father, and not upon the chil-
dren."
92
In Rawlings v. Rawlings,93 the court of appeals upheld a
chancellor's decision that a husband's voluntary participation in
a union strike did not constitute underemployment." Accord-
ingly, the chancellor held that the decrease in the husband's in-
come caused by the strike constituted a material change in cir-
cumstances permitting the court to reduce his child support
obligation.95 The court of appeals noted that the fact that the
husband was exercising a protected right to honor the strike
"neither mandates nor prohibits a reduction in his child support
86. 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991).
87. Id. at 153, 409 S.E.2d at 118. The court of appeals acknowledged that, since
Mr. Auman was not under a court order requiring him to pay support at the time he
changed jobs, Antonelli was "not altogether on point." Auman, 21 Va. App. at 278-79,
464 S.E.2d at 156. Nevertheless, the court of appeals found the matter comparable to
Antonelli to the extent that the breakup of a family does not leave a party free to
disregard his dependents' needs. Id.
88. 21 Va. App. 217, 463 S.E.2d 328 (1995).
89. 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991).
90. Ryan, 21 Va. App. at 219-20, 463 S.E.2d at 329. The husband had held this
job for over 26 years. Id. at 219, 463 S.E.2d at 329.
91. Id. at 221, 463 S.E.2d at 330.
92. Id. at 220, 463 S.E.2d at 329 (quoting Antonelli, 242 Va. at 156, 409 S.E.2d
at 119).
93. 20 Va. App. 663, 460 S.E.2d 581 (1995).
94. Id. at 665-66, 460 S.E.2d at 582.
95. Id. at 669, 460 S.E.2d at 584. The court of appeals held that the strike, rath-
er than the father's participation in it, constituted the material change in circum-




obligation."" Moreover, the husband's "good faith" in partici-
pating in the strike was an insufficient ground for reducing his
court-ordered child support. 7 Nevertheless, the court of ap-
peals found that, because the economic well-being of the family
both during and following the marriage was dependent upon
the economic fortunes of the union, the husband was not under-
employed during the strike.
On the other hand, the court of appeals held in Department
of Social Services ex rel. Ewing v. Ewing9 that a parent who
is voluntarily unemployed while pursuing a possible future gain
in income,1"' "even if done in good faith," is not entitled to a
reduction in child support.'0 '
Pointing out that Virginia Code section 20-108.2(C) defines
"gross income" as "all income from all sources ... [including]
income from salaries [and] wages," °2 the court of appeals held
in Carmon v. Department of Social Services ex rel. Jones°3
that the trial court had properly imputed $300 per month in
income to a mother who had no cash income, but was compen-
sated in the form of room and board in return for her cleaning
services. °
Yet in Sargent v. Sargent, 5 the court of appeals declined to
impute income to a mother who, at the beginning of the mar-
riage, had been a factory worker, but had worked for the past
96. Id. at 668, 460 S.E.2d at 583.
97. Id. at 668-69, 460 S.E.2d at 583-84. See also Commonwealth Dept. of Social
Serv. v. Ewing, 22 Va. App. 466, 471, 470 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1996). See generally
Hamel v. Hamel, 18 Va. App. 10, 13, 441 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1994). ("Ihe risk of re-
duction of income as a result of a parent's intentional act, even if done in good faith,
is insufficient grounds for reducing the amount of support due under a pre-existing
order.").
98. Rawlings, 20 Va. App. at 670, 460 S.E.2d at 584.
99. 22 Va. App. 466, 470 S.E.2d 608 (1996).
100. The father was attending medical school and quit a part-time job as a phar-
macist in his third year due to conflicts with his class schedule. Id. at 468-69, 470
S.E.2d at 609.
101. Id. at 473, 470 S.E.2d at 611-12.
102. Carmon v. Department of Social Serv. ex rel Jones, 21 Va. App. 749, 755,
467 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1996).
103. 21 Va. App. 749, 467 S.E.2d 815 (1996).
104. Id. at 755, 467 S.E.2d at 818.
105. 20 Va. App. 694, 460 S.E.2d 596 (1995).
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four years as a teacher's aide at her son's school."0 6 The court
of appeals held that imputation of income is within the trial
judge's discretion, and the husband failed to present evidence
that factory positions were available, nor did he provide evi-
dence of the hours or shifts that would be required.'
Although there has been no definitive ruling from the appel-
late courts,' the Clarke County Circuit Court held in Linster
v. Linster'° that an incarcerated parent was voluntarily un-
employed and therefore imputed income to him of seven dollars
an hour,"0 his wage prior to incarceration.
E. Custody
1. Relocation
Virginia courts have sent confusing signals this year to par-
ents interested in leaving the Commonwealth with their chil-
dren. Despite the fact that the mother in Mortimer v.
Mortimer"' moved with her children to California without no-
tifying their father, who had joint custody of the children, the
court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to retain phys-
ical custody with the mother. On the other hand, in Laing v.
Walker," a mother lost custody of her children when the
court of appeals agreed that a mother's decision not to relocate
to Egypt, after making extensive plans to do so, constituted a
material change in circumstances necessitating a custody modi-
fication. The court of appeals explained that the "change of
circumstances" test is a broad one, which includes "any myriad
of changes that might exist as to [the minor children]."" The
issue of whether the mother could provide continuing stability
106. Id. at 704, 460 S.E.2d at 600-01.
107. Id., 460 S.E.2d at 601.
108. See L.C.S. v. SAS., 19 Va. App. 709, 718, 453 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1995) (explic-
itly refusing to decide whether an incarcerated parent is voluntarily underemployed);
see also Donnell v. Donnell, 20 Va. App. 37, 455 S.E.2d 256 (1995) (reversing a sup-
port award against an incarcerated father).
109. 37 Va. Cir. 382 (Clarke County 1995).
110. Id.
111. No. 0418-95-4, 1995 WL 764074 (Va. App. 1995) (mem.).
112. No. 1693-94-3, 1995 WL 421421 (Va. App. 1995) (mem.).
113. Id. at *2 (citing Keel v. Keel, 225 Va. 606, 612, 303 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1983)).
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for the children became a critical issue, both when the mother
announced her plans to move to Egypt and when she canceled
those plans.
Similarly, in DeCapri v. DeCapri,"4 the court of appeals up-
held the trial court's refusal to grant a mother sole custody of
her daughter and allow her to move to Ohio, where the
mother's family lived. Although the mother had been accepted
at a community college in Ohio, she conceded that she could
pursue her education in Richmond. The court of appeals noted
that, in addition to having a very close relationship with his
daughter that went beyond simply exercising his normal visita-
tion rights, the father was also willing to provide day care for
his daughter so the mother could return to school.
2. In Camera Interviews
Haase v. Haase" presented the court of appeals with a
matter of first impression in Virginia; that is, whether an in
camera interview conducted with neither parents nor counsel
present, and over the objection of one of the parents, violates
that parent's due process right of confrontation." 6 In Haase,
the father objected to having his eight- and twelve-year-old
children testify regarding their preference as to custody, on the
basis that it would be psychologically detrimental to them."7
The commissioner ruled that he would interview both children
in camera with neither parents nor counsel present."' The
father argued that, absent consent of the parties, this procedure
was improper." The court of appeals noted that, in child cus-
tody disputes, in camera interviews are the favored method of
114. No. 0446-95-2, 1996 WL 22363 (Va. App. 1996) (mem.).
115. 20 Va. App. 671, 460 S.E.2d 585 (1995).
116. Id. at 681, 460 S.E.2d at 589.
117. Id. at 680, 460 S.E.2d at 589.
118. Id. at 677, 460 S.E.2d at 587.
119. Id. at 677-78, 460 S.E.2d at 587-88. Although the commissioner advised the
parties to seek an amendment to the decree of reference if they disagreed with the
procedure, the father did not seek a directive, and the children testified in camera in
the presence of the commissioner only. Id. The commissioner subsequently recom-
mended that the mother be granted sole custody, with extended summer vacation for
the father. Id. at 678, 460 S.E.2d at 588. The chancellor adopted the commissioner's
findings and recommendations, and the father appealed. Id.
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determining a child's views, 120 and that parents' due process
rights must be tempered by the best interests of the child."'
Although the court of appeals declined to establish a bright-line
rule regarding children's testimony in custody disputes, it held
that the judicial officer must consider such factors as the child's
age and maturity, the matters about which they will be asked
to testify, the animosity between the parents, and the likelihood
that one or both of the parents might improperly influence the
child's testimony.' The court of appeals found that, based on
these considerations, it could be appropriate for a judicial offi-
cer to conduct an in camera interview alone.' In order to
protect the procedural rights of the parents when a judicial
officer conducts an interview alone despite a parent's objections,
a transcript of the evidence received must be prepared and
made available upon request of the parents.'
3. Child's Preference
The undisputed preference of a nine-year-old child to live
with his father was held not to be controlling in Sargent v.
Sargent," and custody was awarded to the mother instead.
The trial court was fully aware of the child's wishes, but found
that the child was not old enough to express a preference and
that other factors favored the mother as custodian." The
court of appeals noted that, while the child's preference should
be considered, it is just one factor to be considered and does
not control the custody determination.' While the court of
120. Id. at 680-81, 460 S.E.2d at 589.
121. Id. at 681, 460 S.E.2d at 589-90 (citing Rader v. Montgomery County Dep't of
Soc. Services, 5 Va. App. 523, 528, 365 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1988) (quoting Smith v.
Pond, 5 Va. App. 161, 163, 360 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1987))).
122. Id. at 682, 460 S.E.2d at 590.
123. Id. The court of appeals pointed out that its ruling encompassed only those
interviews conducted by commissioners or chancellors, and declined to express an
opinion on the applicability of such procedures in cases before the juvenile courts. Id.
n.3.
124. Id. at 683, 460 S.E.2d at 590.
125. 20 Va. App. 694, 460 S.E.2d 596 (1995).
126. Id. at 702, 460 S.E.2d at 600.
127. Id., 460 S.E.2d at 599-600. The court of appeals cited Virginia Code § 20-
124.3 for the factors the trial court must consider in determining what custody ar-
rangement will be in the child's best interests. Id. at 701, 460 S.E.2d at 599. Factor
7 is "[tihe reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
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appeals held that the trial court properly considered the statu-
tory factors in awarding custody to the mother, it did not spe-
cifically rule on the issue of whether a nine-year-old is too
young to express a preference.'
4. Jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act
A mother successfully argued in DAgnese v. D'Agnese'
that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (herein-
after "U.C.C.J.A."), a Virginia circuit court could not assume
jurisdiction over the issue of child custody in divorce proceed-
ings because a custody proceeding was already pending in an
Illinois court.' After filing for divorcein Virginia, the mother
took her four children to live in Illinois and filed for an emer-
gency protective order with an Illinois court, claiming that their
father was abusive towards them. 3' The Illinois court granted
the protective order and granted temporary custody to the
mother, 2 who subsequently voluntarily dismissed her Virgin-
ia divorce petition."3 The wife then filed for divorce in Illi-
nois, and several days later the father filed for divorce in Vir-
ginia." The husband failed to respond to the Illinois divorce
petition, and the wife was awarded a divorce and custody of the
children.' 5
During the pendency of both the Virginia and Illinois pro-
ceedings, the wife fied a motion for abstention in Virginia
requesting that the circuit court refrain from exercising juris-
diction due to the Illinois proceedings.3 Despite the fact that
reasonable intelligence, understanding,. age and experience to express such a prefer-
ence." Id. at 702, 460 S.E.2d at 599 (emphasis omitted).
128. Id. at 702-03, 460 S.E.2d at 600.
129. 22 Va. App. 147, 468 S.E.2d 140 (1996).
130. Id. at 151, 468 S.E.2d at 142.
131. The Illinois court rejected the father's motion to dismiss, in which he claimed
Illinois was not a proper forum, and extended the emergency order several times. Id.
at 152, 468 S.E.2d at 142.
132. Id. at 151-52, 468 S.E.2d at 142.
133. Id. at 151, 468 S.E.2d at 142.
134. Id. at 152, 468 S.E.2d at 142. Father's appeal of the Illinois court's judgment
was dismissed. Id.
135. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 142-43.
136. Id. at 152-53, 468 S.E.2d at 142-43.
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the Illinois judge had made findings of abuse under the "emer-
gency jurisdiction" section of the U.C.C.J.A., 37 which the
husband did not challenge, 13 the Virginia circuit court judge
concluded that both courts could take jurisdiction of the matter,
and that the issue was whether one of the courts should decline
jurisdiction at that point.3 9 The Virginia judge then ruled
that, because Virginia was the children's home state, Virginia
was the proper forum to exercise jurisdiction under the
U.C.C.J.A.' The Virginia court denied the wife's motion to
dismiss the husband's petition for lack of jurisdiction and
issued a divorce decree, granted custody to the wife, and later
ordered supervised visitation.' The wife appealed, claiming
the Virginia circuit court had no jurisdiction over the
children.'42
The court of appeals agreed with the wife, and held that once
the Virginia court found that the Illinois court had obtained
emergency jurisdiction, it was required under Virginia Code
section 20-129(A) to defer to the Illinois court,' and any ob-
jection by the husband to the Illinois court's jurisdiction had to
be made in Illinois.' 4 Thus, the Virginia court's judgment as-
suming jurisdiction over the children was reversed and the
visitation order vacated. 145
5. Shared Custody
In a decision that is certain to have a strong impact on the
practice of family law, the Virginia court of appeals strictly
137. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-126(A)(3) (Repi. Vol. 1995).





143. Id. at 155, 468 S.E.2d at 144. Virginia Code section 20-129(A) states that the
Commonwealth shall not exercise jurisdiction when, at the time the petition is filed,
a proceeding concerning child custody is pending in the court of another state "ex-
ercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter." VA. CODE ANN. §
20-129(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995). Although this rule does not apply if the other state court
decides to stay its proceeding in favor of Virginia's court, in this case, the Illinois
court declined to do so. D'Agnese, 22 Va. App. at 154, 468 S.E.2d at 143.




defined a "day" for purposes of interpreting the shared custody
provisions of Virginia Code section 20-108.2(G)(3)(c).' 1 In Ew-
ing v. Ewing,'47 the husband disputed the trial court's refusal
to apply the shared custody support guidelines,' arguing
unsuccessfully that, during periods in which he had visitation
for less than twenty-four hours, he was entitled to credit for a
"day" for purposes of establishing shared custody pursuant to
code section 20-108.2(G)(3)(c).' The court of appeals held that
the legislative intent behind section 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) was that a
"day" should be defined as "any continuous twenty-four hour
period."' Thus, the husband was not entitled to application
of the shared custody provisions of section 20-108.2. The dissent
rejected the majority's strict definition of a day, stating that the
definition of a "day" should equitably account for the actual
time each parent spends with his or her child. 5'
F. Equitable Distribution
1. Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Toomey v.
Toomey 1 2 that an out-of-state resident, who was personally
served with a bill of complaint for divorce and failed to respond
to it, lost her rights to equitable distribution in a Virginia
court.' The wife could have requested that the circuit court
determine her rights prior to entering the divorce decree, or
that it retain its jurisdiction and adjudicate her equitable distri-
bution rights after entering the decree."M The wife's failure to
146. Virginia code section 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) reads in part, "[tlhe shared custody
rules set forth herein apply when each parent has physical custody of a child or
children born of the parties ... for more than 110 days of the year." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) (Cmn. Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
147. 21 Va. App. 34, 461 S.E.2d 417 (1995).
148. Id. at 35, 461 S.E.2d at 417.
149. Id. at 37, 461 S.E.2d at 418.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 38-39, 461 S.E.2d at 418-19 (Elder, J., joined by Benton, J., and
Koontz, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority of states that have ad-
dressed this issue have used an "overnight" standard to determine the applicability of
shared custody. Id. at 39, 461 S.E.2d at 419 (Elder, J., dissenting).
152. 251 Va. 168, 465 S.E.2d 838 (1996).
153. Id. at 172, 465 S.E.2d at 840.
154. Id.
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assert her rights to equitable distribution prior to the entry of
the final decree meant the Virginia circuit court lost its juris-
diction to adjudicate such a claim once it entered the final
divorce decree.'55
2. Fault
O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin5 is significant for its introduction
of the theory of "negative nonmonetary contributions," which in
this case justified making an equitable distribution award in
favor of the wife.'57 In O'Loughlin, the court of appeals upheld
an award of 60% of the marital property to a wife whose hus-
band had numerous affairs during the marriage," thus illus-
trating how a party's marital fault can be shown to have made
a "negative contribution" to the marriage or marital property.
The husband contended on appeal that the trial court's con-
sideration of his "negative nonmonetary contributions" to the
family was a "back door approach" used to punish him for his
infidelity.'59 The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the
trial court had properly considered all the factors in Virginia
Code section 20-107.3 for the purposes of fairly dividing the
marital assets, 6 ' and had specifically declined to consider his
lavish spending on paramours as a factor, due to lack of evi-
dence to support a finding of dissipation. 6' Nevertheless, the
trial court recognized that the husband's infidelity had a neg-
ative impact on the family's well-being. 6 ' The court of appeals
acknowledged that punishment for fault would be "in contraven-
tion of well-established case law" directing courts to consider
the circumstances that affected the economic condition of the
marriage. 1 3 Nevertheless, Aster v. Gross.. did not preclude
155. Id. at 172, 465 S.E.2d at 839-40.
156. 20 Va. App. 522, 458 S.E.2d 323 (1995).
157. Id. at 524, 458 S.E.2d at 324.
158. Id. at 526, 458 S.E.2d at 325.
159. Id. at 525, 458 S.E.2d at 324-25.
160. Id. at 524-29, 458 S.E.2d at 324-26.
161. Id. at 526, 458 S.E.2d at 325.
162. Id.
163. Id. Absent a showing that marital property was used for the benefit of one
spouse, for purposes unrelated to the marriage, in anticipation of separation or di-
vorce, and during a period when the marriage in jeopardy, "no finding of waste or
1348
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
consideration of negative actions of one party that brought
about the dissolution of the marriage.' Thus, "while equita-
ble distribution is not a vehicle to punish behavior, the statuto-
ry guidelines authorize consideration of such behavior as having
an adverse effect on the marriage and justifying an award that
favors one spouse over the other."1
66
3. Gifts
Theismann v. Theismann.67  focused on whether a
husband' intended to give his wife substantial gifts. Shortly
after his 1991 marriage, Mr. Theismann had his farm in
Leesburg, Virginia, deeded jointly to himself and his wife as
tenants by the entireties. 6 ' In addition, he added his wife's
name to a Goldman Sachs account and created a Merrill Lynch
account in the couple's joint names. ° In 1994, the wife filed
for divorce based on her husband's adultery." The trial court
found that these retitlings of property constituted a gift enti-
tling her to a monetary award of $130,000 and spousal support
of $3500 per month.' Upon the wife's motion to reconsider,
which claimed that the court had not properly considered the
marital gifts, the trial court increased the monetary award to
$950,000 on the ground that the previous award failed to give
due weight to the marital gifts.' Both parties appealed. 4
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in making a significant monetary award to the
wife in spite of the short duration of the marriage and the fact
that the husband made most of the financial contributions to
dissipation may be considered as a factor which weighs against the party at fault."
Id. (citations omitted).
164. 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988).
165. OLoughlin, 20 Va. App at 527, 458 S.E.2d at 325.
166. Id. at 526-27, 458 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Smith v. Smith, 18 Va. App. 427,
431-32, 444 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1994)).
167. 22 Va. App. 557, 471 S.E.2d 809 (1996).
168. Former Washington Redskins quarterback Joe Theisman.
169. Theismann, 22 Va. App. at 563, 471 S.E.2d at 812.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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the marriage." 5 The wife proved that her husband intended to
make a gift of the three retitled properties by presenting evi-
dence that he gave her cards in which he said that the farm
was now "our home" and that the money was hers to spend,
and that he bragged he had made her a "millionaire."' 6 More-
over, the husband placed no reservations on the title transfers
allowing him to reclaim the property upon divorce." The
court of appeals held that the trial court's relatively equal dis-
tribution of the gifted property was consistent with Virginia
Code sections 20-107.3(D) and (E) and therefore was not an
abuse of discretion." 8 The husband argued that the- trial
court's "fifty/fifty" division of the gifted assets between the par-
ties was based on its erroneous interpretation of McClanahan v.
McClanahan,"9 which established the principle of the equality
of spouses' equities, rights, and interests in an interspousal gift
of jointly titled property under section 20-107.3(D). The court of
appeals pointed out that, in fact, the wife did not get an exact
fifty percent interest which would have been $1.018 million. 8 '
Moreover, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court had
properly relied on McClanahan in considering the parties' equi-
ties and rights in the gifted property. '
The court of appeals expressly declined to adopt the
husband's proposed rule that an interspousal gift constitutes
marital property in the event of divorce only if the parties affir-
matively so contemplated at the time the gift was made.' 2
Such a rule, observed the court, "would permit donor spouses to
disavow their gifts in practically all cases.""
175. Id. at 565, 471 S.E.2d at 813. "Monetary contributions do not necessarily
carry greater weight than nonmonetary contributions." Id., 471 S.E.2d at 812 (citing
L.C.S. v. SA.., 19 Va. App. 709, 721, 453 S.E.2d 580, 586 (1995)).
176. Id. at 566, 471 S.E.2d at 813.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 568, 471 S.E.2d at 814.
179. 19 Va. App. 399, 451 S.E.2d 691 (1994).
180. Theismann, 22 Va. App. at 566 n.3, 471 S.E.2d at 813, n.3.
181. Id. at 568, 471 S.E.2d at 814.
182. Id. at 566 n.2, 471 S.E.2d at 813, n.2 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.3(AX3)(f) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996)).
183. Id. The husband also argued that the trial court improperly considered his
marital fault in making its award to the wife. Id. at 569, 471 S.E.2d at 815. Al-
though the trial court's first opinion found fault irrelevant to the equitable distribu-
tion, as it had no economic impact on the marital property, the second opinion in-
creased the award because, among other things, it would be inequitable to allow the
1350
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4. Tax Liability
The court of appeals held in Arbuckle v. Arbuckle"84 that
the trial court erred in discounting the value of the husband's
dental practice by the amount of capital gains tax liability that
would have accrued in a hypothetical sale of the practice.'
The court of appeals rejected the husband's reliance on Barnes
v. Barnes,"6 which deemed permissible the consideration of
the tax consequences attributable to a potential future sale of
the marital home,'87 by noting that the Barnes court had not
employed hypothetical tax consequences in determining the
value of the home." Instead, Barnes simply recognized that
transferring jointly owned property to the husband shifted to
him a potential tax liability stemming from the wife's present
ownership interest, and then considered that information in
determining the amounts of the division and the monetary
award." Therefore, the trial court in Arbuckle erred in bas-
ing its appraisal of the dental practice on a potential liability
resulting from a hypothetical sale rather than on the present
fair market value of the property."
husband to use the divorce, caused by his own marital fault, as a means of revoking
an unconditional gift. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 814. The court of appeals reaffirmed its hold-
ings in Aster and O'Loughlin that, although fault cannot be used to punish an offend-
ing spouse, it should be viewed in terms of its "economic impact on the marital es-
tate" and its negative impact on "non-economic aspects of the marriage in determin-
ing a monetary award." Id., 471 S.E.2d at 815. Denying that the trial court increased
the monetary award based on the husband's adultery, the court of appeals held that
the award was modified because the trial court initially "failed to give due consider-
ation to [the wife's] interest in the gifted property." Id. The court of appeals also held
that the trial court properly considered the husband's fault in determining that the
wife was entitled to spousal support. Id. at 572, 471 S.E.2d at 816. At press time,
however, the Virginia Court of Appeals had granted a rehearing of this case. Paul
Fletcher, Court is Refining the Rules on Gifts and E.D. Awards, VA. LAW. WKLY. Aug.
19, 1996, at 1.
184. 22 Va. App. 362, 470 S.E.2d 146 (1996).
185. Id. at 364, 470 S.E.2d at 147. Because the husband had no intention of sell-
ing his practice, the trial court acknowledged that considering potential capital gains
taxes would indulge a legal fiction. Id. at 365, 470 S.E.2d at 147.
186. 16 Va. App. 98, 428 S.E.2d 294 (1993).
187. Arbuckle, 22 Va. App. at 366, 470 S.E.2d at 148.
188. Id. at 367, 470 S.E.2d at 148.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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5. Repayment of Non-Marital Debts
In Hayes v. Hayes"9 the court of appeals held that Virginia
Code section 20-107.3(C)192 authorizes the trial judge to order
the parties to repay each other for non-marital debts. 3 In
Hayes, a husband borrowed money from his wife to pay child
support to his former spouse and to improve his separate
property, both of which were found to be separate debts.'
The trial judge held that the court did not have the authority
to order repayment of these non-marital debts.'95
The court of appeals found the language in section 20-107.3
relating to debt unambiguous, and held that the term "debt" is
not limited to marital debt." Thus, once a trial court finds
that a debt is a separate debt, it has the authority to order
repayment of the debt after considering the factors specified in
section 20-107.3(E). 197
6. Classification of Property
In Stumbo v. Stumbo," the court of appeals reversed a
$30,000 lump-sum award to a wife on the grounds that the
trial court failed to make findings necessary under Virginia
Code section 20-107.3 to properly classify or value marital and
separate property, and to classify or apportion marital debt.'
Because the trial court did not properly consider the rights and
equities of the parties in the marital property or debts, the
191. 21 Va. App. 515, 465 S.E.2d 590 (1996).
192. Virginia Code § 20-107.3(C) states in part: 'The court shall also have the au-
thority to apportion and order the payment of the debts of the parties, or either of
them, that are incurred prior to the dissolution of the marriage, based upon the fac-
tors listed in subsection E." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(c) (RepL Vol. 1995 & Cum.
Supp. 1996).
193. Hayes, 21 Va. App. at 518, 465 S.E.2d at 592.
194. Id. at 519, 465 S.E.2d at 592.
195. Id. at 516, 465 S.E.2d at 591.
196. Id. at 518, 465 S.E.2d at 592. Under § 20-107.3, the authority to require pay-
ment of non-marital debt is limited only to the extent that the factors in subsection
E must be considered. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cure. Supp.
1996).
197. 21 Va. App. at 519, 465 S.E.2d at 592.
198. 20 Va. App. 685, 460 S.E.2d 591 (1995).
199. Id. at 693, 460 S.E.2d at 595.
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court of appeals was unable to determine from the record on
what basis the trial court made the $30,000 equitable distribu-
tion award.2" While the trial court classified and valued some
property as marital, the total value of that property was insuffi-
cient to support a $30,000 award.2"1 Moreover, the trial court
did not determine how much of the debt was incurred prior to
the breakup of the marriage, the basis for the debts, or which
property could serve as security for the debts. 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Sprouse v. Griffin 3
that, where a party to a pending divorce action died after the
couple's marital home was sold but prior to the division of the
proceeds being held in escrow, the funds became the wife's sole
property.2 In Sprouse, while the divorce was pending, the
parties sold their marital home which they owned as tenants by
the entireties.2 5 When the parties could not agree on the dis-
position of the proceeds, the trial court ordered that the fund
be held in escrow until further order of the court.2"' When the
husband died intestate shortly thereafter, his administrator
questioned the trial court's jurisdiction to determine the proper
disposition of the escrow fund.07 The trial court's ruling that
it had jurisdiction was reversed by the court of appeals on the
ground that the husband's death had "divested" the trial court
of its jurisdiction to determine the proper disposition of the
funds.208 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed.2"
The supreme court noted that the husband's death terminat-
ed the marriage and thus abated the divorce suit. 10 However,
the trial court's order establishing the escrow fund "until fur-
ther order of the Court" remained valid, and the circuit court,




203. 250 Va. 46, 458 S.E.2d 770 (1995).
204. Id. at 51, 458 S.E.2d at 773.
205. Id. at 47, 458 S.E.2d at 771.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 49, 458 S.E.2d at 772.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 50, 458 S.E.2d at 772.
210. Id.
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determine the disposition of the escrow fund it had created.21'
The husband's administrator argued that, upon deposit, the
escrowed funds gained as a result of the sale of the marital
home lost their character as property held as tenants by the
entireties." The supreme court disagreed, noting that while
selling real estate owned by a married couple as tenants by the
entireties terminates that estate in that property, the proceeds
from the sale of that property are not prohibited from being an
estate by the entireties."'3 In fact, "[i]n the absence of an
agreement or understanding to the contrary, the proceeds de-
rived from a voluntary sale of real estate held by the entireties
are likewise held by the entireties."1 4 Thus, the trial court
properly ruled that, upon the husband's death, the escrow funds
became the wife's sole property.215
7. Retirement Plans
Mann v. Mann1 6 dealt with an issue of first impression in
Virginia: whether section 20-107.3(A) and its tracing provisions
control the classification of a husband's defined contribution
plan.27 The husband's defined contribution plan was worth
$23,370 when the parties married, and $163,467 when they
separated."' Despite the testimony of the husband's account-
ing expert that the value of the husband's pre-marital contribu-
tions had grown to $61,097 during the marriage as a result of
earnings attributable solely to those funds, the trial court re-
211. Id. at 50, 458 S.E.2d at 773.
212. Id. at 50-51, 458 S.E.2d at 772.
213. Id. at 51, 458 S.E.2d at 773.
214. Id. (quoting Oliver v. Givens, 204 Va. 123, 126-27, 129 S.E.2d 661, 663
(1963)).
215. Id.
216. 22 Va. App. 459, 470 S.E.2d 605 (1996).
217. The court of appeals stated:
A defined contribution plan is comprised of funds held in an account
established by the employee through his employer. [It] is one in which
'the employee and the employer both make contributions to a retirement
plan account, and the employee's benefits are expressed in terms of the
present balance in his account... Thus, upon retirement, a defined
contribution plan gives an employee the funds remaining in his plan
account. .. ."
Id. at 461, 470 S.E.2d at 605-06 (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 461-62, 470 S.E.2d at 606.
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fused to classify the passively earned income on his pre-marital
contribution as the husband's separate property." The court
of appeals reversed and remanded.
On appeal, the wife argued unsuccessfully that the husband
should not be permitted to retrace income gained passively from
his retirement plan, because Virginia's equitable distribution
law treats retirement plans "as a unique species of proper-
ty."'9 The wife therefore contended that retirement plans
should not be subject to the classification and distribution rules
applicable to non-retirement plan assetsY
The court of appeals disagreed that the legislature intended
to exclude retirement plans from the equitable distribution
classification process."  In accordance with section 20-
107.3(A), the marital share of the retirement plan is first deter-
mined under section 20-107.3(G).' This share then fits the
definition of marital property for purposes of tracing separate
property under the equitable distribution provisions of section
20-107.3(A)(3)(b).' Income earned passively during the mar-
riage from separate funds contributed to a defined contribution
plan must be classified like pension funds, which remain pre-
sumptively marital "in the absence of satisfactory evidence that
the property is separate."' The court of appeals noted that
this is equivalent to the statutory provision that separate prop-
erty commingled with marital property retains its separate
character if it can be retraced by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 6 The court of appeals rejected the wife's argument
that section 20-1073(G)(1)'s definition of the marital share of a
pension requires the court to treat all funds earned by the
pension plan during the marriage as marital property.2 7
219. Id. at 462, 470 S.E.2d at 606.
220. Id. at 463, 470 S.E.2d at 606.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cure. Supp. 1996).
224. Id.
225. Mann, 22 Va. App. at 464, 470 S.E.2d at 607 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
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Thus, the trial court erred in failing to classify as separate the
income passively earned by husband's separate contribu-
tions.2=
G. Attorney's Fees
In Bogart v. Bogart,229 the wife successfully argued that the
trial court violated Rule 1:1"o when it modified its equitable
distribution order and awarded attorney's fees to the husband
more than twenty-one days after issuance of the order.23' Al-
though the equitable distribution order denied the husband's
request for attorney's fees, the trial court granted the husband's
motion for reconsideration and granted him attorney's fees. 2
The trial court requested that the husband prepare an order
reflecting this, to be entered within ten days.' However, the
trial court did not enter the final order awarding such fees
until twenty-two days after entry of the original order.'m Rule
1:1 mandates that, at the expiration of twenty-one days after
the date of an order's entry, the trial court loses jurisdiction to
alter a final judgment, order, or decree, with certain exceptions
under section 8.01-428. 5 Because in this case no exceptions
applied, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to disturb the order
after the twenty-first day. 6
H. Bankruptcy
The court of appeals also held in Bogart that the trial court
had jurisdiction to incorporate a property settlement agreement
in its final equitable distribution order, despite a federal bank-
228. Id. at 465, 470 S.E.2d at 608.
229. 21 Va. App. 280, 464 S.E.2d 157 (1995).
230. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:1.
231. Bogart, 21 Va. App. at 283, 464 S.E.2d at 158.
232. Id. at 289, 464 S.E.2d at 161.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 290, 464 S.E.2d at 161. Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
states, "[all final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, shall
remain under the control of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or
suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer." VA. SUP. CT.
R. 1:1.
236. Bogart, 21 Va. App. at 290, 464 S.E.2d at 162.
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ruptcy court's refusal to approve the property settlement agree-
ment."7 After filing for divorce, the wife filed a Chapter 11
petition for bankruptcy, which led to an automatic stay of the
divorce proceedings.' Shortly thereafter, the parties resolved
their equitable distribution and spousal support issues by exe-
cuting a letter agreement.' The bankruptcy court lifted the
automatic stay, allowing the divorce to proceed, but retained
jurisdiction to determine the allowance of claims against the
wife's estate "as the estate shall be constituted pursuant to the
Order of the State Courts."' The bankruptcy court refused to
approve the letter agreement terms on the basis that it was
"not in the best interests of [the wife] and her creditors."241
When the parties subsequently appeared in state court to
resolve the equitable distribution issues, the wife argued that
the bankruptcy court's decision regarding the validity of the
letter agreement was final and binding on all parties and state
courts.' She then moved unsuccessfully for an injunction in
the bankruptcy court to prevent her husband from seeking
approval of the agreement from the state court.' When the
trial court incorporated the terms of the letter agreement into
its final order, the wife appealed.' The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's ruling by stating that the bankruptcy
court's actions revealed that the bankruptcy court had retained
limited jurisdiction,' and it was therefore within the trial
court's jurisdiction to determine whether the agreement was
enforceable and to incorporate the agreement in its final equi-
table distribution decree.'
237. Id. at 289, 464 S.E.2d at 161.
238. Id. at 283, 464 S.E.2d at 158.
239. Id. at 284, 464 S.E.2d at 158.




244. Id. at 284-85, 464 S.E.2d at 159.
245. Id. at 287, 464 S.E.2d at 160.
246. Id. at 289, 464 S.E.2d at 161.
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III. 1996 LEGISLATION
A. Family Court
Passed in 1993, the legislation establishing the parameters of
the family court system in Virginia changed the jurisdiction of
both the Juvenile and Domestic Relations General District
Court and the Circuit Court by transferring all divorce and
family law matters to the Juvenile Court, thereby creating the
"family court." 7 The implementation of the family court sys-
tem was delayed this year until June 1, 1998, contingent upon
funding. 8
B. Divorce
The only bill introduced regarding obtaining a divorce in
Virginia was carried over to the 1997 Session of the General
Assembly. 9 The bill would prohibit no-fault divorces if there
were children born of the marriage. If the parties did not have
children, the bill would require a one-year waiting period and
the consent of both parties to obtain a no-fault divorce. ° This
bill would make getting a divorce based on living separate and
apart impossible for many, and very difficult for others,"4
probably increasing the volume of fault litigation.
247. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (Rep. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
248. Id.
249. H.B. 1188, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
250. Id.
251. Currently, a no-fault divorce can be obtained by parties with children after a
one-year separation, and by parties without children after a six-month separation
with a property settlement agreement. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1995





a. Department of Child Support Enforcement's Authority
One bill amending several sections of the Virginia Code re-
garding the Department of Social Services' Division of Child
Support Enforcement's ("DCSE") jurisdiction and authority
passed the legislature."2 The DCSE's lack of authority to ei-
ther establish or enforce an order dealing only with spousal
support was clarified by this bill.' The bill directs the DCSE
to forward any such order to the appropriate juvenile and do-
mestic relations or family court.'
b. Rehabilitative Alimony
Widely debated this year, rehabilitative alimony is the sub-
ject of a study being done by the Virginia State Bar.255 Addi-
tionally, a bill giving the court authority to order periodic pay-
ments to a spouse over a specific period of time was carried
over to the next session." Currently, the court's authority is
limited to ordering spousal support in a lump sum or periodic
payments over an indefinite time period."
c. Termination/Modification of Spousal Support
Another bill carried over to the 1997 session would add un-
married cohabitation to the statutory list of conditions permit-
ting termination or modification of spousal support.' Cur-
rently, although remarriage is a terminating condition, cohabi-
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.39, -88.48 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.39(G) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
254. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.48(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
255. H.J. Res. 69, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). The General Assembly
continued the authorization for this study. A report is due to the Governor and the
1997 Session of the General Assembly.
256. H.B. 941, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
257. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
258. H.B. 1341, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
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tation is not; therefore, an individual can avoid having their
spousal support terminated or modified simply by not marrying
the person with whom they are cohabitatng. 9 A third bill
regarding the retroactive adjustment of spousal support did not
pass this session."O
2. Child Support
The issue of child support was at the heart of most of the
bills regarding domestic relations introduced and passed this
session.26 ' The bills introduced encompassed topics such as:
establishing child support retroactively, modifying child support,
continuing support for children over the age of eighteen, contin-
uing support for disabled children, establishing minimum sup-
port payments, increasing the amount of attorney's fees, and
delineating certain costs the DCSE can recover in enforcement
actions.
a. Retroactive Child Support
The legislature modified several sections of the Virginia Code
relating to retroactive child support. The first modification gives
the court authority to establish liability for child support back
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
260. H.B. 1128, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). The bill allowed for retro-
active adjustment of spousal support when a support award is reversed on appeal
allowing payments made in the interim to be reimbursed to the payor or credited to
future payments. Id. This bill would have reversed case law which held that the
court lacked the authority to retroactively modify a support award, even though the
court had overturned the award on appeal. See Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 429 S.E.2d
208 (1993). The supreme court held that the only statutory provision for retroactive
modification involved proceedings to increase, decrease, or terminate support. Id. at
412, 429 S.E.2d at 210. In an unpublished opinion, the Virginia Court of Appeals
followed Reid and applied it to a case resulting in an overpayment of over $100,000
by the husband to the wife after she remarried. MacNelly v. MacNelly, No. 1985-94-4
1995 Va. App. LExIS 496 (June 6, 1995). The court held that it did not have the
statutory authority to offset the husband's payments of spousal support during the
appellate phase of his case regarding these payments against the equitable distribu-
tion awarded to his wife. Id.
261. Approximately one-third of the Domestic Relations bills introduced in the 1996
Session of the Virginia General Assembly concerned child support. Of those intro-
duced, approximately two-thirds passed. -LB. Sess. Summaries Nos. 1-9, Va. Gen.
Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
1360
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
to the filing date of an action to determine parentage and/or
child support."2 The court or administrative agency may de-
termine the liability for this period by using the "gross monthly
income of the parties averaged over the period of retroactivi-
ty. 2" Prior to this legislation, retroactivity applied only to
modification and not initial support determination.2 Howev-
er, practitioners may have experienced cases in which retroac-
tive support was applied to initial support petitions.
Balancing the early determination of liability permitted by
this statute is an additional requirement that the "complainant
exercise[ ] due diligence in the service of the respondent,"265
which applies explicitly to actions filed in court.266 Therefore,
it is arguable that the "due diligence requirement" does not
apply to an administrative determination of child support liabili-
ty.267 Retroactive liability in an administrative action is estab-
lished as of "the date the order directing payment is delivered
to the sheriff or process server for service on the obligor."26
There is no mention of "due diligence." Nor is there any men-
tion of the payee's obligation to give the DCSE accurate infor-
mation regarding the payor's location.
The legislature did not change the statute relating to the
court's ability to retroactively modify child support.269 There-
fore, practitioners should note that the date used for retroactive
modification is different than the new date established for ret-
roactive initial determination of child support. Thus, the court
may only retroactively modify child support back to the date
"during which there is a pending petition for modification, but
only from the date that notice of such petition has been given
to the responding party."270
262. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.8, -108.2 (Cure. Supp. 1996).
263. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
264. The title of this section is "Revision and alteration of such decrees." VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-108 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996). By reading the entire section, it
appears that it only applies to retroactive modification of existing support orders, and
not to an initial determination of support.
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.8(A) (Cue. Supp. 1996).
266. Id.
267. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Can. Supp. 1996).
268. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1(A) (Cam. Supp. 1996).
269. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cue. Supp. 1996).
270. Id.
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The legislature's two changes to the statute regarding admin-
istrative modification of child support obligations make the
amended section more applicable to administrative proce-
dures."' The section now reads that notice of the administra-
tive proceeding is "pursuant to [section] 8.01-296 "2 '2 and given
to the "nonrequesting party.""' Previously the notice was giv-
en to the "responding party." 4 Furthermore, when filing a
proposed modified order of child support, the DCSE now has
the authority to choose between the original court or the court
having current jurisdiction.Y
b. Child Support Guidelines
The legislature amended the child support guidelines to clari-
fy that the minimum child support obligation is sixty-five dol-
lars a month.276 Although the statute does not provide an ex-
ception for reasons such as unemployment or illness, the pre-
sumptive amount can be rebutted with the statutory factors for
deviation. 77
Also, the legislature gave the DCSE the authority to impute
income when a person is "voluntarily unemployed or fails to
provide verification of income upon request of the Depart-
ment . ...27" However, the DCSE cannot impute income to
the custodial parent, if: "(i) a child is not regularly attending
school, (ii) child care services are not available, or (iii) the cost
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-252.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
272. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-296 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1996). This section
deals with the manner of serving process upon natural persons.
273. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-252.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996). Additionally, "notice pursuant
to § 8.01-296" was added to make the DCSE's notice requirements consistent when
initiating reviews of certain orders. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-252.2 (Cum Supp. 1996).
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-252.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
275. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-252.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996). The DCSE was previously
limited to filing in the court that originally entered the order. See VA. CODE ANN. §
63.1-252.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996). This statute makes clear
that courts cannot prorate support obligations based on where the income falls within
the $0-599 range in the child support table. Id. A rebuttable minimum of $65 is now
established. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
277. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996). Rebuttal of presumptive child
support obligation amounts can be done using the factors in this section.
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-264.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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of such child care services are not added to the basic child
support obligation."279
c. Extension of Child Support Beyond Age Eighteen
Four bills passed regarding the extension of child support,
thus amending several sections of the Virginia Code.8 These
amendments clarified the court's authority to continue support
for a child over the age of eighteen if the child meets the other
necessary requirements, including being a full-time student and
living at homey Additionally, the legislature provided the
court with the authority to continue support for disabled chil-
dren. 2 Support for disabled children is continued past the
age of eighteen if the child is: "(i) severely and permanently
mentally or physically disabled, (ii) unable to live independently
and support himself, and (ii) resides in the home of the parent
seeking or receiving child support."' If a disabled adult child
receiving social security or other government support meets
these conditions, then the support obligation cannot be termi-
nated on the basis that he is "earning a living.' Section 20-
124.2 applies to continuing support, but does not give the court
authority to make an initial determination of support if an
adult becomes disabled, or if a child has temporary conditions
caused by physical or mental ailments.21 In addition to sepa-
rate child support proceedings these changes were incorporated
into the sections giving the court authority to make orders re-
garding these issues in pending suits for divorce, annulment,
and separate maintenance."s
279. Id. The court's authority to impute income is broader than the administrative
body's authority. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
280. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103-124.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
278.15 (Repl. VoL 1996).
281. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
278.15 (Repl. Vol. 1996). The child continues to get support until he/she is nineteen
or graduates from high school, whichever occurs first.
282. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
283. Id.
284. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Prior to this amendment this sec-
tion could have been interpreted to terminate support when a disabled adult is re-
ceiving governmental support.
285. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
286. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Cum. Supp. 1996). Subsection (A)(v) directs the
court "to provide support for any child of the parties to whom a duty of support is
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d. Department of Social Services: Division of Child Support
Enforcement's Authority
Previously, large employers were not required to make more
than a single payment to the DCSE covering all of the payroll
withholding orders for their individual employees.' Now,
when orders come from a support enforcement agency outside
the Commonwealth, the employer must honor each individual-
ly.288
When physical custody changes, the DCSE now has the au-
thority to change the payee of child support payments without
requesting such a change from the court, which should create a
more efficient process. 9 The DCSE can take this action when
"an assignment of rights has been made to the Department or
an application for services has been made by ... [a] caretaker,
relative, or individual with the DCSE."' °
The most significant bill passed pertaining to the DCSE ex-
pands its ability to recover attorney's fees and actual costs in
enforcement actions.291 Although the DCSE could previously
recover attorney's fees if it prevailed,292 it was restricted to a
maximum equal to court-appointed rates, which are minimal
and controlled by statute."3 Now, the DCSE can recover "rea-
sonable attorney's fees."294 In addition, the DCSE may now re-
cover costs of "service of process and seizure and sale pursuant
to a levy on a judgment."295 The recovery of "costs" permitted
by this statute should arguably be limited to those specifically
delineated.
A new section provides guidelines for a pilot program to
owed and to continue to support any child over the age of eighteen who meets the
requirements set forth in subsection(C) of § 20-124.2." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
287. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-60.5(E), -79.3(AX16) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-60.5(E), -79.3(A)(16), -79.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
289. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
290. Id.
291. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-274.10 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
292. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-274.10 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
293. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
294. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-274.10 (Curn. Supp. 1996).
295. Id. The costs are specifically delineated.
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privatize child support enforcement. 6 It includes a preference
for contracting with individuals who lose their positions with
the DCSE due to its privatization, 9 ' and directs the State
Board to establish guidelines regarding the DCSE's responsi-
bilities under this section. 8 The Attorney General is directed
to provide and supervise DCSE's legal services, and is given the
authority to contract with private attorneys and collection agen-
cies."
e. Restricted Driver's License Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction has changed for petitioning the court for a
restricted license when an individual loses his license because
of child support delinquency."' If the DCSE suspends or re-
fuses to renew an individual's license for this reason, the indi-
vidual now must petition the juvenile court rather than the
general district court.30'
f. Separate Maintenance and Annulment Authority
Circuit courts have been given the authority to make a fur-
ther decree regarding the support of a minor in a decree for
separate maintenance.0 2 The court was also given the author-
ity to affirm, ratify, and incorporate by reference a decree re-
garding the support of a minor in a decree entered for annul-
ment or separate maintenance.03
296. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-249.1, -249.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1996). A detailed report
evaluating this pilot project from the Office of the Attorney General and the DCSE is
due to the General Assembly by July 1, 1997 and each year thereafter. VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-249.1(D) (Cu. Supp. 1996).
297. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-249.1(A) (Cn. Supp. 1996).
298.. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-249.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-249.1(C) (Cum Supp. 1996).
300. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-320 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
30L Id.
302. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
303. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
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g. Legislation Carried Over to 1997 Session
Two bills regarding child support were carried over to the
next session.'" The first, entitled "The Child Support Security
Deposit Act," authorizes the court to require a delinquent
parent to deposit assets equal to the lesser of one year of child
support payments or $6,000.'05 The assets would be managed
by either a trustee appointed by the court or the DCSE."'
This type of action would only apply to those parties against
whom the court cannot order wage withholding, such as self-
employed individuals and those for whom an assignment of
wages would not be sufficient to cover the child support obliga-
tion. o7
The second bill was proposed in response to the Virginia
Court of Appeal's recent decision regarding the definition of a
"day" for purposes of determining the amount one pays based
on shared custody situations.05 The bill would define a "day"
to include overnight stays rather than a continuous twenty-four-
304. H.B. 1106, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); S.B. 496, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). Four other bills were killed this session: H.B. 995, Va. Gen.
Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); H.B. 52, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); H.B.
1321, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); S.B. 68, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess.
1996). One bill would have given a court of equity the authority to order an account-
ing of a custodial parent's or guardian's use of child support monies based on good
cause shown. H.B. 995, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
Several bills which would have increased criminal penalties for nonpayment of
child support by adding felony provisions failed this session: H.B. 52, Va. Gen. As-
sembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); H.B. 1321, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); S.B. 68,
Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). Currently the code makes provisions only for
misdemeanor convictions. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-60.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
305. H.B. 1106, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). This bill would only apply if
an individual was sixty days or more in arrears. Id. The bill also provides for the
sale of assets which are not readily convertible into money. Id. The bill creates a re-
buttable presumption that a failure to pay is willful and then lists defenses to an
order for depositing assets. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. H.B. 854, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). In Ewing v. Ewing, 21 Va.
App. 34, 461 S.E.2d 417 (1995), the court held that the General Assembly intended
for a day to mean a 24-hour continuous period of time in determining whether a
custody arrangement meets the shared custody definition. Id at 37, 461 S.E.2d at
418; see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
1996] DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1367
hour period.3" This definition would likely broaden the usage
of shared custody guidelines.
D. Child Custody
Of the four bills that were introduced regarding custody this
year, one passed,31 two were carried over to next year,1 '
and the last failed." The bill which passed was referred to
earlier under child support, and gave the court the authority to
make a decree regarding the custody of a minor in a decree for
separate maintenance." It also gave the court the authority
to affirm, ratify, and incorporate by reference a decree regard-
ing the custody of a minor in a decree entered for annulment or
separate maintenance. 4
Introduced in both the house and senate, the bill that was
carried over would create a rebuttable presumption of joint
physical and legal custody in divorce proceedings as being in
the best interest of the child."1 With many courts already in-
clined towards joint custody, sole custody could become difficult
to obtain for a client.
309. H.B. 854, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
310. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
311. H.B. 992, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); S.B. 496, Va. Gen. Assembly,
(Reg. Sess. 1996).
312. S.B. 358, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). The bill, which failed by be-
ing passed by indefinitely by the house, provided that a petition in either the juve-
nile and domestic relations district court or the circuit court would divest the other
court of jurisdiction. Id. Once a petition is filed in the juvenile and domestic relations
court, the court would have had to give the other party notice, and that party could
have transferred the matter to the circuit court. Id. Further, any custody matters
decided by the juvenile and domestic relations district court would have been ap-
pealed for de nova review in the court of appeals rather than the circuit court. Id.
The ability to transfer a custody matter to circuit court prior to a determination by
the juvenile and domestic relations district court could be very useful to the practitio-
ner. On the other hand, as a practical matter, custody and support issues are tried
concurrently in many cases and the different avenues for appeal or rights of transfer
could be very confusing and wasteful.
313. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1996). See supra note 302 and accom-
panying text.
314. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1996). See supra note 303 and accom-
panying text.
315. I-LB. 992, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); S.B. 496, Va. Gen. Assembly,
(Reg. Sess. 1996).
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E. Domestic Violence
1. Legislation Effective July 1, 1996
To bring state law into compliance with the federal Violence
Against Women Act of 1994,16 the legislature passed a bill
giving foreign protective orders full faith and credit, and delin-
eating the procedural method to follow.
17
2. Legislation Effective July 1, 1997
Over the past several years, attention has been focused on
the topic of domestic violence. In 1993, Chief Justice Carrico
started the Domestic Violence Coordinating Council, and in
1994, the General Assembly established the Commission on
Family Violence Prevention to continue the work begun by the
Council.3 1 The Commission was charged "to study family vio-
lence, identify existing services and resources to address family
violence, investigate ways to coordinate the delivery of services
and resources, increase public awareness of available services,
and determine services, resources and legislation needed to
address, prevent and treat family violence.""1 The legislature's
response to the 1996 Commission report was the enactment of
sweeping legislation in the area of domestic violence."'0 This
section focuses on civil protective orders arising from domestic
violence. 2'
316. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat.
1902 to 1955 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
317. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
318. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION STUDYING FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION, H. Doc.
No. 50 at 3 (1996); H.J. Res. 279, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1994).
319. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION STUDYING FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION, H. Doc.
No. 50 at 3 (1996).
320. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-170 (Cum Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243, -245.1,
-253, -253.1, -253.2, -253.4, -278.14, -279.1, -296, -298 (Repl. Vol. 1996); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-57.2, -60.3, -308.1:4 (Repl. Vol. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81, -81.3,
-81.4 (Cure. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Cum. Supp. 1996); H.J. Res. 229,
Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
321. Beyond the scope of this article are the many statutory amendments ad-
dressing criminal penalties for perpetrators of domestic violence. VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-57.2, -60.3, -308.1:4 (Repl. Vol. 1996); VA- CODE ANN. § 19.2-81, -8L3 (Cun.
Supp. 1996). However, it should be noted that a bill invalidating the court's ability to
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First and foremost, reflecting a shift in philosophy regarding
abuse, the legislature changed the statutory language from
"spousal abuse" to "family abuse."3" Significantly, the term
"family abuse" could be interpreted to include all aspects of
abuse, including elder abuse. The legislature also added or
changed language in various sections to reflect that protective
orders can cover not only the petitioner, but also family or
household members of the petitioner."s
Moreover, the legislature deleted any reference to rehabilita-
tion of the respondent and/or reconciliation of the family as a
goal of a protective order." Instead, the need for a protective
order is now based solely on the health and safety of the peti-
tioner and/or the family or household members of the petition-
er, making it easier for an individual to obtain an emergency
protective order."m The amendment allows the allegedly
abused person to get an emergency protective order directly
from the magistrate or judge, who must issue the emergency
protective order if he finds "reasonable grounds to believe that
(i) the respondent has committed family abuse and (ii) there is
probable danger of a further such offense against a family or
household member by the respondent.""6 In contrast, the cur-
rent provision requires the probability that an assault and
battery has occurred, and makes the issuance of a protective
permissive rather than mandatory. "
The legislature also added new grounds permitting the issu-
ance of a preliminary protective order and extended the length
of time an emergency protective order remains in effect. Cur-
rently, preliminary protective orders can only be issued on the
grounds of "immediate and present danger of family abuse."a"
accept a satisfaction and discharge in cases of domestic assault, defined as an assault
against a family or household member, was carried over to the 1997 session. H.B.
150, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
322. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243(AX3), -245.1, -253.1, -296, -298 (Repl. Vol. 1996)
(excepting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1, -296 (effective July 1, 1997)).
323. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253, -253.1, -253.4, -278.14, -279.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Cun. Supp. 1996).
324. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
325. Id.
326. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4(B) (Repl Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997).
327. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
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Beginning in July, 1997, the court may issue an ex parte pre-
liminary protective order based on "[immediate and present
danger of family abuse or evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause that family abuse has recently occurred."3
The latter standard is easier to meet. Currently, an emergency
protective order can only remain in effect until 5:00 p.m. the
next business day."3 ° The new legislation allows the order to
remain in effect until 5:00 p.m. the next business day, or up to
seventy-two hours, whichever is longer.
331
Several changes were made to the statutory provisions re-
garding the content of protective orders. The new provisions
extend the life of the protective order from one year to a maxi-
mum of two years.3 2 In addition, a new provision allows the
court to temporarily grant possession and exclusive use of a
jointly owned automobile without affecting the vehicle's ti-
tle.33 A delineation of the court's authority to make provisions
for temporary custody and/or visitation of a minor child pursu-
ant to the protective order was also included in the amend-
ments,3" modifying the current provision that broadly permits
the court to order any other relief necessary for the protection
of minor children.3 5
To further facilitate obtaining a protective order, the legisla-
ture has changed the venue requirements. As of July 1, 1997,
to improve consistency in adjudication, a petitioner can return
to the court which issued a protective order that is current for
future proceedings resulting from new family abuse."5
329. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997).
330. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
331. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997).
332. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997). Existing
language states that the "order of protection shall be issued for a specified period not
to exceed one year." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(B) (Cum- Supp. 1995) (emphasis
added). New language states that the protective order "may be issued for a specified
period, however, unless otherwise authorized by law, a protective order may not be
issued under this section for a period longer than two years." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
279.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1996) (emphasis added).
333. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997).
334. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(7) (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997).
335. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
336. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243(AX3) (Repl. Vol. 1996) (effective July 1, 1997).
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3. Legislation Carried Over to 1997 Session
Carried over was a bill duplicating many of the same provi-
sions already passed in the legislation which becomes effective
July 1, 1997.m' However, this bill contains two notable differ-
ences from the enacted legislation. First, this bill specifically
permits family members, such as parents, children, siblings, or
grandparents, whether or not they live in the same household
as the petitioner, to be identified within the protective or-
der."' Second, venue would be continuous in any court that
had previously entered a protective order even if there was no
current order in effect."
F. Procedural
Several sections were modified to require that the petitioner
or applicant pay the cost of publication when the court orders
that notice be given by publication.'
G. Marriage, Termination of Parental Rights/Paternity,
Equitable Distribution
The two bills introduced this session directly relating to mar-
riage,3" and the only bill regarding terminating the parent-
337. H.B. 155, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
338. Id.; cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4, -279.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
339. H.B. 155, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243
(Repl. Vol. 1996).
340. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-316, -317 (Cum. Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-104
(Cum. Supp. 1996).
341. One bill would have overturned Virginia's current recognition of some mar-
riages entered into lawfully in other states that would otherwise be void or voidable
if entered into in Virginia. H.B. 1189, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). Virginia
currently recognizes some marriages entered into lawfully in other states; however
this does not apply when the marriage goes against Virginia's public policy.
Greenhow v. James, 80 Va. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 603 (1885). Virginia probably would not
recognize same sex marriages since they are against public policy and statutorily
prohibited, even if another state held such marriage valid. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
45.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995). Even so, Representative McClure's bill would have made void
all marriages which could not be entered lawfully into in Virginia. H.B. 1189, Va.
Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). While this bill did not pass, it is expected that the
current trend towards conservatism will be influential in the legislature.
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child relationship, did not pass.' There were no bills regard-
ing equitable distribution introduced this session.
IV. CONCLUSION
Controversial judicial opinions regarding imputed income
indicate that this is likely to remain a hotly litigated issue.
While numerous legislative changes were made in 1996 in the
areas of child support and domestic violence, some of these
amendments will not become effective until 1997. It is impor-
tant to note that the legislature delayed acting on important
issues such as rehabilitative alimony, prohibition of no-fault
divorces, and the definition of a "day" relating to shared custo-
dy. Moreover, funding considerations continue to jeopardize
implementation of the family court.
The other proposed bill reflects the legislature's aggressive response to the
issue of domestic violence. H.B. 616, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). The bill
would have required the Department of Vital Statistics to add wording regarding
family abuse in its pamphlet of marriage requirements received by individuals apply-
ing for a marriage license. Id.
342. The bill would have allowed a parent-child relationship to be terminated if a
subsequent blood test showed a 98% probability that a man is not the biological
father. H.B. 781, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996). This amendment to the termi-
nation statute could have influenced paternity terminations. Current case law holds
that a man may be collaterally estopped from challenging paternity once he has ac-
knowledged paternity. Slagle v. Slagle, 11 Va. App. 341, 398 S.E. 2d 346 (1990). This
amendment could have been used to allow a man to petition the court to terminate
his residual parental rights, including the obligation of child support, based on a
subsequent blood test. H.B. 781, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1996).
